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THE NEXUS REQUIREMENT AFTER BRISTOL-MYERS:
DOES “ARISE OUT OF OR RELATE TO” REQUIRE
CAUSATION?
Levi M. Klinger-Christiansen*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2011, the Supreme Court took on the issue of minimum contacts
personal jurisdiction for the first time since 1988. The two cases it heard,
J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro and Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations,
S.A. v. Brown, resulted in opinions limiting the scope of both specific and
general jurisdiction.1 This trend of diminishing the Court’s minimum
contacts jurisprudence has continued throughout the decade, leading to the
Court’s 2017 opinion in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of
California.2 The Bristol-Myers opinion also marked a first. It served as the
first time the Court analyzed the “nexus requirement” of specific
jurisdiction since the Court recognized the difference between general and
specific jurisdiction in Helicopteros De Colombia v. Hall over thirty years
earlier.3 Specifically, the question of when a plaintiff’s claim, “arise[s] out
of or relate[s] to the [defendant’s] activities in the forum state.”4
Bristol-Myers presented an opportunity for the Supreme Court to
provide much needed clarification to the nexus requirement after the Court
left the meaning of the nexus requirement rather unclear in Helicopteros.
*

J.D. Candidate, 2020, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A, 2017, The College of
New Jersey. I would like to thank Professor Denis McLaughlin for his insightful and
careful guidance through the process of writing this Comment. Additionally, thank you
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1
J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011); Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011).
2
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017).
3
Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984). To assert
specific jurisdiction a court must first find that the defendant had “certain minimum contacts
with [the forum].” Id. (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
Second, the court must also find the “cause of action [to] arise out of or relate to [the
defendant’s] activities in the forum state.” Id. Some courts and commenters use the term
“nexus requirement” to refer to the second requirement; this Comment will borrow that
language. See, e.g., Shoppers Food Warehouse v. Moreno, 746 A.2d 320, 332 (D.C. 2000);
Linda Sandstrom Simard, Meeting Expectations: Two Profiles for Specific Jurisdiction, 38
IND. L. REV. 343, 348 (2005).
4
Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414.
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As a result, courts and commenters have provided various interpretations of
the nexus requirement’s meaning since Helicopteros. Ultimately, BristolMyers did not clarify every aspect of the nexus requirement’s meaning,
leaving many competing interpretations untouched. On the other hand,
despite the Court’s insistence that it decided Bristol-Myers on “settled
principles of personal jurisdiction,” this Comment suggests that the opinion
narrowed the understanding of what the nexus requirement means.5
This Comment argues that Bristol-Myers has largely narrowed the
nexus requirement to require at-least but-for causation between the
plaintiff’s claim and the defendant’s forum contacts in most situations;6
however, not in every situation. Language from Bristol-Myers creates
space for a narrow circumstance in which a non-causal connection between
the plaintiff’s claim and the defendant’s forum contacts may remain viable.
This narrow circumstance falls directly in line with Professor Sandstrom
Simard’s concept of “hybrid jurisdiction.”7 Furthermore, not only does this
approach remain potentially viable, but the Court should also embrace it in
the interest of fairness.8
Because an in-depth understanding of the nexus requirement is
necessary to understand the implication of Bristol-Myers, Part II of this
5

Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1783.
But-for causation “is satisfied when the plaintiff’s claim would not have arisen in the
absence of the defendant’s contacts” with the forum state. 16 Moore’s Federal Practice, §
108.42(7)(b) (Mathew Bender 3d Ed.). Courts have different approaches on what kind of
causation between the defendant’s contacts and the plaintiff’s injury the Due Process Clause
requires. See infra Sec. III. A and B.
7
Linda Sandstrom Simard, Hybrid Personal Jurisdiction: It’s Not General
Jurisdiction, or Specific Jurisdiction, but is it Constitutional?, CASE W. RES. L. REV. 559
(1998). Professor Sandstrom Simard describes “hybrid jurisdiction” as a combination of the
“requirements of general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction without satisfying either type
of jurisdiction completely,” though ultimately arguing that “hybrid jurisdiction may satisfy
the underlying goals of specific jurisdiction and thus be constitutional.” Id. at 563. This
Comment suggests that the Bristol-Myers opinion has further bolstered the argument for
hybrid jurisdiction’s constitutionality.
8
On January 17, 2020, the United States Supreme Court granted petitions for
certiorari on two State Supreme Court cases coming out of Minnesota and Montana. See
Bandemer v. Ford Motor Co., 931 N.W.2d 744 (Minn. 2019), cert. granted, 2020 WL
254152 (U.S. Jan. 17, 2020) (No. 19-369); Ford Motor Co., v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct.,
443 P.3d 407 (Mont. 2019), cert. granted, 2020 WL 254155 (U.S. Jan. 17, 2020) (No. 19368). The resolution of these two cases, Ford Motor Company v. Montana Eighth Judicial
District Court and Bandemer v. Ford Motor Co., which the United States Supreme Court
has consolidated into one case, will necessarily require answering the question posed by this
Comment: does “arise out of or relate to” require causation? Significantly, both the
Minnesota and Montana Supreme Courts, in their respective opinions, accepted the viability
of a non-causal test for the nexus requirement, with both opinions generally tracking the
function of hybrid jurisdiction. See Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 751–55; Ford, 443 P.3d at
414–17. Thus, the Supreme Court now has the opportunity to embrace hybrid jurisdiction
as a valid test under the nexus requirement, which this Comment suggests would be a
prudent decision. See infra Sec. V.B.
6
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Comment will provide an overview of the minimum contacts and nexus
requirements of specific jurisdiction. This section will look to Justice
Brennan’s dissent in Helicopteros as a guiding framework for the rest of
the Comment. Next, because the Court left the nexus requirement unclear
in Helicopteros, Part III will survey the various interpretations that have
arisen both before and after Helicopteros. This is also necessary for
understanding the landscape that Bristol-Myers has now re-shaped. Part IV
will then provide a review of the Bristol-Myers opinion. Part V will
provide an analysis of what Bristol-Myers has changed. Part VI will argue
why the Court should embrace hybrid jurisdiction. Part VII will discuss
questions that require further examination if the Court does embrace hybrid
jurisdiction. Finally, Part VIII will summarize and conclude.
II. OVERVIEW OF SPECIFIC JURISDICTION
A. The Minimum Contacts Requirement
In International Shoe v. Washington, the Supreme Court first
established the “minimum contacts” test as a constitutionally valid basis for
acquiring personal jurisdiction over a defendant.9 The Court stated, “due
process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in
personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have
certain minimum contacts with [the forum].”10
In Hanson v. Denckla, the Court further emphasized that in order to
acquire personal jurisdiction through minimum contacts “it is essential in
each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails
itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus
invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.”11 In effect, this
requirement means, “the unilateral activity of [plaintiffs] who claim some
relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of
contact with the forum State.”12 In Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, the
Court further noted that “whether the defendant purposefully established
‘minimum contacts’ in the forum State” is the “constitutional touchstone”
to a court’s valid assertion of personal jurisdiction through minimum
contacts.13 This minimum contact requirement constitutes the first
requirement of specific personal jurisdiction.14
9

Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (emphasis added).
Id.
11
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
12
Id.
13
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985) (citing Int’l Shoe, 326
U.S. at 316.).
14
See Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 413 n.8 (1984)
(stating that due process requires “‘certain minimum contacts with [the forum]’” and then
10
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B. The Nexus Requirement
Starting with International Shoe, the Supreme Court hinted at the
existence of two types of personal jurisdiction through minimum contacts.15
The Court explained:
[T]o the extent that a [defendant] exercises the privilege of
conducting activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and
protection of the laws of that state. The exercise of that privilege
may give rise to obligations; and, so far as those obligations arise
out of or are connected with the activities within the state, a
procedure which requires the [defendant] to respond to a suit
brought to enforce them can, in most instances, hardly be said to
be undue.16
The Court also stated, however, that “there have been instances in which
the continuous corporate operations within a state were thought so
substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of
action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities.”17
Hence, the Court suggested two situations in which a forum may be able to
assert personal jurisdiction by means of minimum contacts: one where the
claim is connected to the defendant’s activity in the forum and one where it
is not.18 Professors Von Mehren and Trautman defined the former as
“specific jurisdiction” and the latter as “general jurisdiction.”19
The Supreme Court officially adopted Professors Von Mehren and
Trautman’s framework in Helicopteros.20 The case was a wrongful death
action resulting from a helicopter crash in Peru that killed four American
citizens.21 The defendant helicopter company, Helicol, was a Colombian
corporation that provided helicopter transportation in South America for a
pipeline project by the decedents’ employer.22 The defendant purchased
the helicopter involved in the crash in Texas.23 The defendant and the
decedents’ employer also negotiated the helicopter transportation contract
in Texas that resulted in the fatal crash in Peru.24 Furthermore, the

noting that when such contacts are coupled with the nexus requirement “the State is
exercising ‘specific jurisdiction’ over the defendant.” (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.)).
15
See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
16
Id.
17
Id. at 318.
18
See id.
19
Arthur Von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested
Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136 (1966).
20
Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 nn.8–9 (1984).
21
Id. at 410.
22
Id. at 409.
23
Id. at 426 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
24
Id. at 410–11.
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defendant “sent prospective pilots to Fort Worth[, Texas] for training,” and
the pilot who crashed the helicopter in question received his training in
Texas.25 The families of the American citizens sued the foreign helicopter
company in Texas state court.26
The Court used this case as an opportunity to adopt Professors Von
Mehren and Trautman’s concepts of “specific” and “general” jurisdiction.27
The Court stated that “when a State exercises personal jurisdiction over a
defendant in a suit arising out of or related to the defendant’s contacts with
the forum, the State is exercising ‘specific jurisdiction’ over the
defendant.”28 Conversely, the Court then explained that “when a State
exercises personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit not arising out of
or related to the defendant’s contacts with the forum, the State has been
said to be exercising ‘general jurisdiction’ over the defendant.”29
With the adoption of Professors Von Mehren and Trautman’s
framework, the nexus requirement officially entered the Court’s minimum
contacts jurisprudence and serves as the second requirement for specific
jurisdiction.30 The Court, however, did not go any further in attempting to
clarify what the nexus requirement actually means; rather, “[b]ecause the
parties [did not] argue[] any relationship between the cause of action and
Helicol’s contacts with the State of Texas [the Court] assert[ed] no ‘view’
with respect to that issue.”31 The Court only considered “whether
[Helicol’s contacts with Texas] constitut[ed] the kind of continuous and
systematic general business contact” necessary to assert general
jurisdiction, and ultimately held that Helicol’s contacts were not sufficient
to assert general jurisdiction.32 Thus, the Court declined to answer:
(1) whether the terms ‘arising out of’ and ‘related to’ describe
different connections between a cause of action and a
defendant’s contacts with a forum, and (2) what sort of tie
between a cause of action and a defendant’s contacts with a
forum is necessary to a determination that either connection

25

Id. at 411; id. at 426 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Helicol had other contacts with Texas
including the purchasing of “helicopters (approximately 80% of its fleet), spare parts, and
accessories for more than $4 million from Bell Helicopter Company in Fort Worth.” Id. at
411.
26
Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 412.
27
Id. at 414 nn.8–9.
28
Id. at 414 n.8 (citing Von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 19, at 1144–64).
29
Id. at 414 n.9 (citing Von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 19, at 1144–64).
30
See id. at 414.
31
Id. at 415 n.10. Justice Brennan contested this finding. Id. at 425 n.3 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (“Nor do I agree with the Court that the respondents have conceded that their
claims are not related to Helicol’s activities within the State of Texas.”).
32
Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416.
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exists.33
This Comment seeks to pose potential answers to both of those
questions. Justice Brennan’s dissent, in which he argued that Texas could
have asserted specific jurisdiction, provides a suitable starting point for this
task.34 On the question of specific jurisdiction, Justice Brennan first took
issue with the majority for not considering “any distinction between
contacts that are ‘related to’ the underlying cause of action and contacts
that ‘give rise’ to the underlying cause of action.”35 In distinguishing the
two phrases, Justice Brennan agreed that the “cause of action did not
formally ‘arise out of’ specific activities initiated by Helicol in the State of
Texas.”36
Justice Brennan, however, argued that the “relate to” phrase could
mean something much different. Though not defining the parameters of
the phrase “relate to,” Justice Brennan’s application of the phrase to the
facts of Helicopteros suggested he viewed the phrase as allowing specific
jurisdiction when there is but-for causation between the plaintiff’s claim
and the defendant’s contacts with the forum.37 This is so because Justice
Brennan noted that the pilot involved in the crash acquired his training in
Texas, Helicol negotiated the contract in Texas, and Helicol bought the
particular helicopter involved in the Peru crash in Texas. 38 From these
contacts Justice Brennan argued “[t]his is simply not a case, therefore, in
which a state court has asserted jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant
on the basis of wholly unrelated contacts with the forum.”39
Unfortunately, aside from finding that the Helicol’s contacts in Texas
did in fact “relate to” the cause of action, Justice Brennan did not further
33

Id. at 415 n.10.
Id. at 424 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
35
Id. at 425.
36
Id. Justice Brennan did not explicitly define what he meant for a “cause of action to
formally ar[i]se out of the defendant’s contacts with the State,” but his criticism of limiting
specific jurisdiction to such instances shed light on his formulation of the term. Id. He
argued that “limiting specific jurisdiction of a forum” to causes of action that formally arise
out of a defendant’s contacts with the forum “would subject constitutional standards under
the Due Process Clause to the vagaries of the substantive law or pleading requirements of
each State.” Id. In criticizing such a result, Justice Brennan noted that “if the respondents
had simply added an allegation of negligence in the training provided for the Helicol pilot,
then presumably the [majority] would [have] concede[d] that the specific jurisdiction of the
Texas courts was applicable.” Id. at 427.
37
Id. at 425–26.
38
Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 426.
39
Id. Justice Brennan also argued that the jury in the original Texas trial had
“specifically found that ‘the pilot failed to keep the helicopter under proper control,’
[and] . . . that ‘such flying was negligence’ . . . .” Id. at 426 n.4. This further solidifies that
Justice Brennan’s theory of “relate to” in this particular case was based on broad but-for
causation.
34
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clarify or promulgate an operative test to define any parameters of how far
a court can go in finding that a defendant’s contacts with a forum “relate
to” the plaintiff’s injury. Therefore, while Justice Brennan’s dissent
provided some analysis of the nexus requirement and a way of separating
the requirement’s two key phrases, the dissent still left the nexus
requirement extremely broad and unclear. The Court did not analyze the
application of the nexus requirement again until Bristol-Myers.40
III. VARYING INTERPRETATIONS OF THE NEXUS REQUIREMENT
The Supreme Court has never clarified what it means for a plaintiff’s
claim to “arise out of or relate to” the defendant’s contacts with the forum
State. As a result, lower courts and commenters have filled the void with
varying interpretations of the nexus requirement. This Comment will use
Justice Brennan’s separation of “arise out of” and “relate to” as a way of
categorizing these different interpretations. Under Justice Brennan’s lens,
most of these interpretations can be classified as an application of “relate
to,” as opposed to “arise out of.” Hence, most of these interpretations
allow a court to assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant even when an
element of a claim does not formally “arise out of” the defendant’s contacts
with the forum State as Justice Brennan’s articulation of “arise out of”
requires.41 This expansion of “relate to” is largely in response to an issue
Professor Richman aptly described:
An issue that surfaces from time to time is whether jurisdiction is
proper in a case that falls between these two paradigms [general
and specific jurisdiction]: one where the defendant has
substantial contacts with the forum, but not so many as to justify
general jurisdiction, and where the plaintiff’s cause of action
does not arise out of the defendant’s forum activities, although it
is not totally unrelated to them.42
Courts and commenters have tackled this issue by applying various
interpretations of what the nexus requirement can mean. This section
discusses the three various interpretations of the nexus requirement, which
include (A) the two causation approaches, (i) but-for causation and (ii)
40

To be sure, the Court did describe the nexus requirement in both Goodyear and
Daimler AG v. Bauman. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915,
923–24 (2011); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 127 (2014). Bristol-Myers,
however, was the first time the Court’s holding required an application of the nexus
requirement. See infra Sec. IV.
41
See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 424. Note that courts do not necessarily rely on Justice
Brennan’s framework, often referring to “arise out of or relate to” as one standard. This
Comment simply uses Justice Brennan’s framework as a useful guide and classification
system.
42
William M. Richman, A Sliding Scale to Supplement the Distinction Between
General and Specific Jurisdiction, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 1328, 1337 (1984).
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proximate causation, and (B) the similarity approach.43 This section then
considers two scholarly contributions toward analyzing the nexus
requirement: (C) the sliding scale, and (D) hybrid jurisdiction.
A. The Causation Approaches
The Courts of Appeals for each of the federal circuits use some form
of causation as the basis of their nexus requirement analysis.44 Courts and
commenters have generally narrowed the causal tests into two major
categories: but-for causation and proximate causation.45 As noted above,
but-for causation is satisfied when the plaintiff’s claim would not have
arisen but-for the defendant’s contacts with the forum.46 Proximate
causation, on the other hand, requires a closer connection between the
plaintiff’s injuries and the defendant’s contacts with the forum; in many
ways it more closely resembles Justice Brennan’s formulation of “arise out
of.”
1. But-for causation
But-for causation uses a relaxed causal test.47 As the name suggests,
“this standard is satisfied when the plaintiff’s claim would not have arisen
in the absence of the defendant’s contacts.”48 Hence, but-for causation
resembles the analysis Justice Brennan performed in his Helicopteros
dissent.49 The Ninth Circuit is the primary adherent to this test.50
The Ninth’s Circuit’s analysis in Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines
provides a classic example of but-for causation.51 The case involved an
injury the plaintiff sustained while on a cruise.52 The plaintiff purchased a
ticket for the cruise through a sales agent in the plaintiff’s home state of
Washington; while on the cruise in international waters off the coast of

43

Bender, supra note 6 (“Three general approaches have emerged.”). These
approaches are but-for causation, proximate causation, and the “substantial connection” or
the “discernable relationship standard.” Id. Under the third approach, “causation is of no
special importance.” Id. I have labeled the third approach the “similarity approach.”
44
See id.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
O’Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., 496 F.3d 312, 319 (3d Cir. 2007) (“A . . . more
relaxed test requires only ‘but-for’ causation.”).
48
Id. (citing Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 385–86 (9th Cir. 1990)).
49
See Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 425–26 (1984)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
50
Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 385 (9th Cir. 1990) rev’d on other
grounds, 499 U.S. 585 (1991); Bender, supra note 6.
51
See Shute, 897 F.2d at 379.
52
Id.
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Mexico, the plaintiff slipped and injured herself.53 The plaintiff sued
Carnival Cruise in the federal district court in Washington State.54 Carnival
Cruise argued that while it had contacts in Washington, the claim did not
“arise out of or relate to” those contacts because the injury occurred in
international waters off the coast of Mexico.55 The district court agreed
and dismissed the case on grounds of lack of personal jurisdiction.56 The
Ninth Circuit reversed.57
In its personal jurisdiction analysis, the Ninth Circuit first asserted
that Carnival Cruise had sufficient minimum contacts with the state of
Washington, as Carnival Cruise reached out to the individuals in the state
to sell cruise tickets, advertised on local media, and promoted its cruises
through in-state travel agents.58
The Ninth Circuit then moved to its analysis of the nexus
requirement.59 The court first rejected the “stringent standard of causation”
used by the First and Eighth Circuits, which Carnival Cruise urged the
Ninth Circuit to employ as well.60 Instead, the court applied the but-for
causation test, finding that “[i]n the absence of Carnival’s activity, the
Shutes would not have taken the cruise, and Mrs. Shute’s injury would not
have occurred.”61 The court found a substantial nexus because “[i]t was
Carnival’s forum-related activities that put the parties within ‘tortious
striking distance’ of one another.”62 Under Justice Brennan’s framework,
this test necessarily falls under “relate to,” because it does not require that
an element of the claim—such as duty, breach or proximate causation—to

53

Id.
Id. at 377.
55
See id. at 379.
56
Id.
57
Shute, 897 F.2d at 379.
58
Id. at 382 (“[I]t is difficult to conclude that Carnival did not purposefully avail itself
of the laws of Washington. It advertised in local media, promoted its cruises through
brochures sent to travel agents in that state, and paid a commission on sales of cruises in that
state.”).
59
Id. at 383 (“[T]he claim must ‘arise out of’ the defendant’s forum-related
activities.”). Note that the Ninth Circuit only used the terms “arise out of” and not “relate
to,” suggesting how some courts do not necessarily see a difference between these terms.
This further demonstrates the confusion over the nexus requirement, as there is no clearly
established vocabulary that courts use when referring to the nexus requirement.
60
Id. (citing Marino v. Hyatt Corp., 793 F.2d 427 (1st Cir. 1986); Pearrow v. Nat’l Life
& Accident Ins. Co., 703 F.2d 1067 (8th Cir. 1983)). The court then agreed that “[w]ere
this court to apply the ‘arising from’ analysis of Marino and Pearrow to this case, we would
conclude that Mrs. Shute’s fall did not arise out of Carnival’s solicitation of business in
Washington.” Id.
61
Id. at 386.
62
Id.
54
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formally arise out the defendant’s forum contacts.63
2. Proximate Causation
In United Electric, Radio & Machine Workers v. 163 Pleasant St.
Corp., the First Circuit articulated a more stringent interpretation of the
nexus requirement under the label of proximate causation.64 The court
noted that “we steadfastly reject the exercise of personal jurisdiction
whenever the connection between the cause of action and the defendant’s
forum-state contacts seems attenuated and indirect.”65 Rather, the First
Circuit requires the defendant’s forum contacts to “form an ‘important, or
[at least] material, element of proof’ in the plaintiff’s case.” 66 Hence, the
court has “suggested an analogy between the [nexus] requirement and the
binary concept of causation in tort law under which both elements—[butfor causation] and legal cause (i.e., the defendant’s in-state conduct gave
birth to the cause of action)—must be satisfied to find causation sufficient
to support specific jurisdiction.”67
The federal district court of Massachusetts’s opinion in Rodriguez v.
Samsung Electronics Co., provides a useful modern application of the
proximate causation test articulated in United Electric.68 This case
involved an employee of Axcelis Technologies, Inc. (“Axcelis-US”) who
sued Samsung after he sustained permanent injuries when he traveled to
Korea to install an ion implanter on Samsung premises.69 During
discovery, Samsung indicated that, a separate company, Axcelis-Korea,
supervised and directed the installation.70 Axcelis-Korea is a whollyowned subsidiary of Axcelis-US with its principal place of business in
Korea, providing sales and support services in both Korea and China.71
Plaintiff then amended his complaint to include Axcelis-Korea; the
subsidiary filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.72
The district court interestingly began its analysis with the nexus
requirement rather than the minimum contacts requirement.73 Applying the
63

See Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 425–27 (1984).
United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. 163 Pleasant St. Corp., 960 F.2d 1080,
1089 (1st Cir. 1992).
65
Id.
66
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Marino v. Hyatt Corp., 793 F.2d 427, 430 (1st
Cir. 1986)).
67
Id.
68
Rodriguez v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 827 F. Supp. 2d 47 (D. Mass. 2011).
69
Id. at 50.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id. at 51. After finding that specific jurisdiction did not exist under the nexus
64
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proximate causation test, the court first noted that “Axcelis-Korea’s in-state
contract with Axcelis-US was surely a but-for cause of Rodriguez’s
injury.”74 Nonetheless, the court found that proximate causation did not
exist because the plaintiff’s “negligence claim sounds in tort, not contract,
and it arose directly out of allegedly tortious conduct which occurred
entirely in Korea.”75 Hence, Axcelis-Korea’s “limited contacts with
Massachusetts [were] not . . . an important or material element of proof in
plaintiffs’ case.”76
The proximate causation test is quite similar to Professor Brilmayer’s
“substantive relevance” test.77 Professor Brilmayer’s test provides that,
“[a] contact is related to the controversy if it is the geographical
qualification of a fact relevant to the merits.”78 This means that a specific
contact must be relevant to an element of the claim the plaintiff asserts.79
For example, had the contract in Rodriguez included a clause imposing a
duty of reasonable care on Axcelis-Korea, the duty element of the
negligence claim may have been sufficiently linked to the contract in
Massachusetts and therefore allow for specific jurisdiction in the forum.
Thus, the proximate causation test and the substantive relevance test fall
under Justice Brenan’s definition of “arise out of,” as both require that a
formal element of the claim arises out of the defendant’s contacts with the
forum.80

requirement, the court then performed a minimum contacts analysis and found that AxcelisKorea did not even have sufficient minimum contacts with Massachusetts. Id. at 52. This is
interesting because typically courts analyze the minimum contacts requirement first, likely
because it is often an easier inquiry.
74
Rodriguez, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 51 (“Had Axcelis-Korea not entered into a contract in
Massachusetts with Axcelis-US to perform services in Korea, its managers would not have
been present at Samsung’s facility to supervise the installation and Rodriguez would not
have been injured as a result of their allegedly negligent acts or omissions.”).
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Lea Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court
Jurisdiction, 77 SUP. CT. REV. 77, 82 (1980). See also O’Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co.,
Ltd., 496 F.3d 312, 318–19 (3d. Cir. 2007) (“The most restrictive standard is the ‘proximate
cause’ or ‘substantive relevance’ test.”) (citing id.). Other commenters, however, disagree
with this conflation. Charles W. Rhodes & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Toward a New
Equilibrium in Personal Jurisdiction, 48 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 207, 237 (2014) (noting the
“erroneous conflation of [substantive relevance] with the proximate cause approach adopted
by some lower courts and commentators . . . .”).
78
Brilmayer, supra note 77, at 82.
79
Id.
80
O’Connor, 496 F.3d at 319 (“Justice Brennan, dissenting in Helicopteros, similarly
described [proximate causation or substantive relevance] as a requirement that ‘the cause of
action . . . formally “arise out of” the [defendant’s] contacts.’”) (quoting Helicopteros
Nacionales De Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 426–27 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
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B. The Similarity Approach
The similarity approach is the broadest possible reading of “relate to,”
as it does not require a causal connection between the plaintiff’s claim and
the defendant’s contacts at all.81 Though rejecting it outright, Professor
Brilmayer explains that the similarity approach authorizes a forum to assert
specific jurisdiction over a defendant for an injury that occurred outside the
forum if there is a “similarity between the forum activity and the activity
which gave rise to the controversy.”82
While none of the Courts of Appeals currently use a similarity
approach,83 Professor Brilmayer pointed to an instance where the California
Supreme Court seemed to do so.84 In Cornelison v. Chaney, the California
Supreme Court upheld specific jurisdiction over a defendant truck driver
who delivered goods into California approximately twenty times per year
for an injury that the driver caused in Nevada while he was on his way to
California.85 After finding that the truck driver had minimum contacts with
California, but not enough to establish general jurisdiction,86 the court
explained that its “inquiry is directed to whether plaintiff’s cause of
action . . . arises out of or has a substantial connection with a business
relationship defendant has purposefully established with California.”87 The
court then held “[t]he accident arose out of the driving of a truck, the very
activity which was the essential basis of defendant’s contacts with this
state[,]” and then concluded that this created a “substantial connection”
between the defendant’s forum contacts and the plaintiff’s cause of
action.88
Shoppers Food Warehouse v. Moreno presents another example of the
similarity approach. In this case, the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals used what it called the “discernible relationship” test.89 The case
81

Brilmayer, supra note 77, at 83.
Id.
83
Bender, supra note 6.
84
Brilmayer, supra note 77, at 83.
85
Cornelison v. Chaney, 545 P.2d 264, 266 (Cal. 1976).
86
Id. at 267 (“In our view, these contacts are not sufficient to justify the exercise of
jurisdiction over defendant without regard to whether plaintiff’s cause of action is relevant
to California activity.”).
87
Id. (emphasis added).
88
Id. at 268.
89
Shoppers Food Warehouse v. Moreno, 746 A.2d 320, 335 (D.C. 2000). This test is
directly analogous to the “substantial connection” test used in Cornelison. Indeed, the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals directly cited Cornelison, and then stated that under
its discernable relationship test, “for the Superior Court to have jurisdiction over Ms.
Moreno’s claim, the claim had to be related to or substantially connected with Shoppers’
advertising activity in the District.” Id. (emphasis added). I have labeled both these tests as
the “similarity approach,” because both tests only seem to require “similarity between the
82
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involved a District of Columbia resident who slipped and injured herself at
a Shoppers store in Maryland.90 Shoppers advertised its stores, located in
Virginia and Maryland, in the District of Columbia.91 The plaintiff sued in
the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.92 On appeal, the court of
appeals held that jurisdiction over Shoppers was valid because a
“discernible relationship” existed between Shoppers’s continuous conduct
in the District of Columbia and the conduct that caused the claim of
action.93 The court found a “discernable relationship” noting: “it is
reasonably foreseeable that, as a result of advertising extensively and over
a substantial period of time in the District’s major circulation newspaper,
Shoppers could be sued in the District on a claim similar to that filed by
Ms. Moreno [plaintiff].”94 Hence, the “discernable relationship” test, as
used in Shoppers, uses similarity as a basis of establishing the nexus
requirement. Under Justice Brennan’s framework, the similarity approach
must fall under Justice Brennan’s definition of “relate to” if it fits into the
framework at all, as it certainly does not fulfill the requirements of Justice
Brennan’s definition of “arise out of.”
C. The Sliding Scale
Professor Richman’s solution to the problem of the grey area between
general and specific jurisdiction is the “sliding scale” approach. 95 This test
can plausibly operate as a supplement to either the causal tests or the
similarity approach. The concept rests on the idea of viewing general and
specific jurisdiction as the opposite poles of a spectrum.96 Across this
spectrum, Professor Richman considered two key variables: the “extent of
the defendant’s forum contacts” and the “proximity of the connection
between those contacts and the plaintiff’s claim.”97 He noted that as the
forum activity and the activity which gave rise to the controversy.” Brilmayer, supra note
77, at 83. It is also worth noting that specific jurisdiction likely could have been asserted in
this case under a but-for causation theory, but the court explicitly rejected the causal tests in
favor of the “discernable relationship” test, thus suggesting that this test is less stringent
than even but-for causation. Shoppers, 746 A.2d at 335 (“Based upon our review of nexus
tests [the court discussed but-for causation in this review] . . . we see no reason to deviate
from . . . our past decisions which have interpreted the ‘arise from’ language of [the District
of Columbia’s long arm statute] flexibly and synonymously with ‘relate to’ or having a
‘substantial connection with’ . . . .”).
90
Shoppers, 746 A.2d at 323.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Id. at 336.
94
Id. (emphasis added).
95
Richman, supra note 42, at 1345.
96
Id. (“The concepts of general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction are simply the two
opposite ends of this sliding scale.”).
97
Id.
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defendant’s forum contacts increase, the proximity to the plaintiff’s claim
may decrease, leading to the one polar extreme of general jurisdiction.98
On the other hand, as the defendant’s forum contacts decrease, the test
requires a stronger connection between those contacts in order to assert
jurisdiction.99 This connection could, of course, be a causal connection.
As the contacts become stronger, the more attenuated the causal connection
can be until reaching the point of a highly attenuated, but-for causation; as
the contacts decrease, perhaps something akin to proximate causation
would be more appropriate.100 The test, can also conceivably lead to the
assertion of jurisdiction even when there is not a causal link between the
plaintiff’s claim and the defendant’s forum activities, or at least so
attenuated a causal link that a court would not even entertain the assertion
of personal jurisdiction under a but-for causation analysis.
Professor Richman provides a factual hypothetical that suggests the
use of the sliding scale approach when a potentially non-causal relationship
exists between the defendant’s forum contacts and the plaintiff’s claim.101
He uses an example of a California resident who regularly uses a drug in
California.102
The manufacturer advertises and sells the drug in
California.103 The plaintiff then travels to New York, buys a dosage of the
drug in New York, and sustains injuries in New York from the drug.104
The plaintiff sues in California.105 In this example, the defendant’s actions
in California do not cause the plaintiff’s claim.106 Under the sliding scale
approach, Professor Richman suggests that the continuous contacts with
California and the plaintiff’s relationship to California should be enough to
allow for specific jurisdiction over the drug company.107 Further, because
the continuous contacts are identical to the actions by the company in New
York that caused the injury, there would be no unreasonableness or
98

Id.
Id.
100
See id. (“As the quantity and quality of the defendant’s forum contacts increase, a
weaker connection between the plaintiff’s claim and those contacts is permissible; as the
quantity and quality of the defendant’s forum contacts decrease, a stronger connection
between the plaintiff’s claim and those contacts is required.”).
101
Richman, supra note 42, at 1344.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
Id. Of course, one can argue that the plaintiff would not have bought the drug in
New York had the drug company in California not exposed him to the drug in California.
This scenario, however, clearly differs from the other examples where but-for causation has
been found, when the defendant enters the contract in the forum and then the plaintiff gets
injured somewhere else. Here, the actual contract of sale for the drug occurs in New York.
Id.
107
Richman, supra note 42, at 1344.
99
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unfairness in allowing a court to assert personal jurisdiction in
California.108
D. Hybrid Jurisdiction
Professor Sandstrom Simard referred to “hybrid jurisdiction” as the
grey area between general and specific jurisdiction.109 This Comment
views Professor Sandstrom Simard’s concept of hybrid jurisdiction as an
approach to the nexus requirement of specific jurisdiction under specific
factual circumstances.110 When viewed as an interpretation of the nexus
requirement, hybrid jurisdiction builds upon the similarity approach, as it
does not require causation.111 Professor Sandstrom Simard characterized
hybrid jurisdiction by relying on the following language found in a uniform
long-arm statute:
A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who
acts directly or by an agent . . . causing tortious injury in this
state by an act or omission outside this state if he regularly does
or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of
conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or
consumed or services rendered, in this state . . . .112
Professor Sandstrom Simard further added that the contacts with the state
must be shown to possibly “result in factual circumstances similar to those
that gave rise to the plaintiff’s claim.”113 The key difference between
hybrid jurisdiction and the similarity approach is that, while hybrid
jurisdiction allows for mere similarity to satisfy the nexus requirement, as
opposed to causation between the defendant’s contacts with the forum and
the plaintiff’s claim, the injury itself must occur in the forum.114 Thus, like
108

Id.
Sandstrom Simard, supra note 7, at 563 (“[Hybrid Jurisdiction] appears to combine
the requirements of general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction without satisfying either
type of jurisdiction completely.”).
110
Indeed, Professor Sandstrom Simard ultimately found hybrid jurisdiction to be most
reconcilable with specific jurisdiction. Id. (“The Article suggests that although hybrid
jurisdiction does not satisfy the traditional test for specific jurisdiction requiring a claim to
‘arise out of’ the defendant’s purposeful contacts with the forum, some instances of hybrid
jurisdiction may satisfy the underlying goals of specific jurisdiction and thus be
constitutional.”).
111
Sandstrom Simard, supra note 7, at 588 (stating that in analyzing hybrid jurisdiction
“we must consider whether the purposes and goals of specific jurisdiction can be satisfied in
the absence of a causal relationship between the plaintiff’s claim and the defendant’s forum
contacts”).
112
Sandstrom Simard, supra note 7, at 562 (quoting Unif. Interstate and Int’l Procedure
Act § 1.03, 13 U.L.A. 361 (1962)).
113
Sandstrom Simard, supra note 7, at 589.
114
After Daimler AG v. Bauman (discussed below), Professors Rhodes and Robertson
suggested a similar means of establishing specific jurisdiction. Rhodes and Robertson,
109
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the similarity approach, hybrid jurisdiction falls under Justice Brennan’s
category of “relate to” as opposed to “arise out of.” 115
Professor Sandstrom Simard pointed out that not many courts have
explicitly adopted hybrid jurisdiction, but some have functionally used it.116
For example, in Vermeulen v. Renault, the Eleventh Circuit found specific
jurisdiction in a factual situation implicating hybrid jurisdiction.117 In
Vermeulen, the plaintiff bought a used Renault vehicle in North Carolina.118
She then moved to Georgia where she was involved in a car accident.119
Renault regularly sold cars in Georgia, though the plaintiff did not buy her
specific vehicle there.120 The plaintiff sued Renault in Georgia.121 The
federal district court dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction; the
supra note 77, at 240. Their proposal, however, relies on Professor Brilmayer’s substantive
relevance. Rhodes and Robertson, supra note 77, at 237 (“Professor Brilmayer’s
substantive relevance . . . is probably the best candidate.”). Rhodes and Robertson noted
that substantive relevance asks whether “any of the factual occurrences that are conditions
for the claim,” including “injury . . . arose from the defendant’s actions within or directed at
the forum.” Id. Therefore, when the injury occurs in a state that the defendant has
continuous and similar contacts with, that state can assert personal jurisdiction because an
element of the claim, “injury,” arose out of the defendant’s contacts with the forum. Id.
This ends in the same result as hybrid jurisdiction. Rhodes and Robertson’s proposal,
however, used the word “arose,” which still seems to suggest that causation is needed, and
thus creating tension within their proposal. This Comment argues that hybrid jurisdiction is
a more sound way of reaching the same goal, considering causation is necessarily lacking in
the situations where either approach would allow a court to assert specific jurisdiction.
Additionally, Robertson and Rhodes’ proposal differs from hybrid jurisdiction in that they
also suggest that their formulation of substantive relevance be expanded to also allow a
court to assert jurisdiction in a forum the defendant has continuous contacts in and that the
plaintiff resides in even though they were not injured in the forum. Rhodes and Robertson,
supra note 77, at 242. (“[I]f the defendant is conducting extensive forum activities similar
to the episode in dispute, and the suit implicates another sovereign state interest (such as
providing a convenient forum for state citizens or protecting against harms suffered in the
state), the relevant state interests will typically outweigh the minimal litigation burdens on
the defendant.”).
115
Professor Sandstrom Simard indicated that hybrid jurisdiction fails the nexus
requirement completely, stating that hybrid jurisdiction does not “require the plaintiff’s
cause of action to arise out of (or even relate to) the defendant’s forum contacts.”
Sandstrom Simard, supra note 7, at 575. Instead, Professor Sandstrom Simard argued that
hybrid jurisdiction is constitutional, based on a functionalist argument that hybrid
jurisdiction still achieves the constitutional rationales of specific jurisdiction, without
necessarily fulfilling the formal nexus requirement. Sandstrom Simard, supra note 7, at
582–83. Under Justice Brennan’s framework, there is no indication that hybrid jurisdiction
cannot fit into his sweeping definition of “relate-to.” Furthermore, as this comment later
argues, hybrid jurisdiction likely fulfills the nexus requirement even under Bristol-Myers.
Infra Sec. V. B.
116
See Sandstrom Simard, supra note 7, at 602, 608.
117
Sandstrom Simard, supra note 7, at 601–02.
118
Vermeulen v. Renault, U.S.A., Inc., 975 F.2d 746, 748 (11th Cir. 1992).
119
Id.
120
Id. at 748–50.
121
Id. at 747.
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Eleventh Circuit reversed.122
The Eleventh Circuit found that Renault’s contacts with Georgia were
“sufficiently related to [the plaintiff’s] cause of action to confer specific
jurisdiction” because its “activities . . . were inextricable links in the
advertising and distribution network by which the [plaintiff] obtained her
vehicle . . . .”123 As Professor Sandstrom Simard argued, the Eleventh
Circuit attempted to show a causal connection in its “inextricable link”
argument, when in reality there was “no evidence of a causal link between
the defendant’s contacts with Georgia and the plaintiff’s cause of
action.”124 Therefore, while the court attempted to shoehorn its analysis to
fit a causal test, its analysis more properly fit the requirements of hybrid
jurisdiction.
Another factual scenario where a court implicitly applied hybrid
jurisdiction, though labeled it as general jurisdiction, is in Lemke v. St.
Margaret Hospital.125 In Lemke, Dr. U.H Patel, a surgeon, worked for St.
Margaret—a hospital based in Indiana.126 The hospital regularly advertised
in Illinois.127 Dr. Patel treated the plaintiff’s son, an Illinois resident, in the
Indiana hospital.128 The record, however, did not reveal any evidence that
the plaintiff’s son came to St. Margaret because of the advertisements in
Illinois.129 The plaintiff’s son returned to Illinois and then died because of
alleged malpractice by Dr. Patel.130 The plaintiff sued the hospital and Dr.
Patel in Illinois state court, and the defendants removed to the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.131 Here, the facts created
a textbook hybrid jurisdiction situation, as the defendant caused tortious
injury in Illinois “by an act or omission outside [a] state” in which the
defendant “regularly [conducted] or solicit[ed] business.”132 The court,
however, asserted personal jurisdiction over the hospital by finding that the
hospital’s solicitations in Illinois constituted strong enough contacts to
implicate general jurisdiction.133

122

Id. at 747–48.
Id. at 760.
124
Sandstrom Simard, supra note 7, at 602.
125
Lemke v. St. Margaret Hosp., 552 F. Supp. 833 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
126
Id. at 835.
127
Id. at 835–36.
128
Id. at 835.
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
Lemke, 552 F. Supp. at 835.
132
Sandstrom Simard, supra note 7, at 562 (quoting Unif. Interstate and Int’l Procedure
Act § 1.03, 13 U.L.A. 361 (1962)).
133
Lemke, 552 F. Supp. at 838–39.
123
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Professor Sandstrom Simard argued that applying hybrid jurisdiction
would have been a much sounder approach, as the court unnecessarily
diluted the meaning of general jurisdiction.134 Of course, in the wake of
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown and Daimler AG v.
Bauman, the Illinois court would no longer be able to make such a strained
general jurisdiction analysis, leaving hybrid jurisdiction or the similarity
approach as the only way to assert jurisdiction in such a case. 135
IV. THE BRISTOL-MYERS OPINION136
The opinion marked a narrowing of the above jurisprudence as to
when a claim properly arises out of or relates to a defendant’s forum
contacts. The opinion implicitly rejected the similarity approach and
explicitly rejected the sliding scale as a supplement to the similarity
approach. This Comment argues, however, that the opinion still leaves
room for hybrid jurisdiction.
A. Situating the Opinion within the Supreme Court’s Recent
Personal Jurisdiction Decisions
Bristol-Myers did not occur in a vacuum; the opinion is part of a
restrictive trend in the Supreme Court’s recent opinions. Bristol-Myers is
the sixth case in the past decade to mark a tightening by the Court in its
personal jurisdiction jurisprudence.137 In two of these cases, J. McIntyre
Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro and Walden v. Fiore, the Court declined to
exercise personal jurisdiction, finding a lack of minimum contacts.138 The
Court also released three rulings that restricted the scope of general
jurisdiction.139 Due to the important link between the nexus requirement
and the concepts of specific and general jurisdiction, these decisions
narrowing the scope of general jurisdiction are relevant in understanding
the effect of Bristol-Myers. Therefore, this section will begin with a brief
review of Goodyear.140
Goodyear involved a bus accident in France, allegedly connected to

134

Sandstrom Simard, supra note 7, at 608–09.
Infra Section IV. A. i.
136
The remainder of this Comment will refer to the Bristol-Myers opinion as “the
opinion” or “Bristol-Myers.”
137
See BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549 (2017); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571
U.S. 117 (2014); Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations,
S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873
(2011).
138
Walden, 571 U.S. at 277; J. McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 873.
139
BNSF, 137 S. Ct. at 1549; Daimler, 571 U.S. at 117; Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 915.
140
Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 915.
135
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defective tires that resulted in the deaths of two American children.141 The
children’s parents sued Goodyear USA and three of Goodyear USA’s
European subsidiaries142 in North Carolina.143 Goodyear USA, an Ohio
corporation with plants in North Carolina, “regularly engaged in
commercial activity” in the forum and did not contest jurisdiction.144
Conversely, the three foreign subsidiaries (“petitioners”), which
“manufacture tires primarily for sale in European and Asian Markets,” but
whose products had been “distributed within North Carolina by other
Goodyear USA affiliates,” contested personal jurisdiction.145
The North Carolina Court of Appeals disagreed with the defendants
and invoked general jurisdiction over petitioners.146 The Court of Appeals
held that the petitioners’ contacts with North Carolina reached the
threshold of general jurisdiction, “when petitioners placed their tires ‘in the
stream of interstate commerce without any limitation on the extent to which
those tires could be sold in North Carolina.’”147 Moreover, the Court of
Appeals found that the “tires made by petitioners reached North Carolina as
a consequence of a ‘highly-organized distribution process’ involving other
Goodyear USA subsidiaries.”148
After the North Carolina Supreme Court denied review, the United
States Supreme Court granted the defendants’ writ of certiorari and struck
down the Court of Appeals’ assertion of general jurisdiction.149 The
Supreme Court explained that a “stream of commerce” theory can often be
invoked to prove contacts with a forum by a defendant acting outside the
forum whose products reached the forum and caused an injury inside the
forum; but such cases are specific jurisdiction cases.150 Here, however, the
stream of commerce theory, which indicated that some of petitioner’s tires
reached the forum, “f[e]ll far short of the ‘the continuous and systematic

141

Id. at 920.
The three Goodyear USA subsidiaries were organized in and operated out of
Luxembourg, Turkey and France, respectively. Id. at 918.
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
Id. at 918, 920–21 (“In contrast to . . . Goodyear USA . . . petitioners are not
registered to do business in North Carolina. They have no place of business, employees, or
bank accounts in North Carolina. They do not design, manufacture, or advertise their
products in North Carolina.”).
146
Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 921–22 (“Acknowledging that the claims neither ‘related to,
nor . . . ar[o]se from, [petitioners’] contacts with North Carolina,’ the Court of Appeals
confined its analysis to ‘general rather than specific jurisdiction. . . .’”) (alterations in
original).
147
Id. at 922.
148
Id.
149
Id. at 929.
150
Id. at 926.
142
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general business contacts’ necessary to empower North Carolina to
entertain suit against [petitioners] on claims unrelated” to the forum.151
Goodyear involved forum contacts by the defendants that constituted
the kind of “continuous and systematic” general business contacts
necessary to implicate general jurisdiction under prior case law. 152 The
Court’s language describing general jurisdiction in the early portion of the
opinion, however, marked a potential narrowing of general jurisdiction.
The majority explained that “[a] court may assert general jurisdiction over
foreign (sister-state or foreign country) corporations to hear any and all
claims against them when their affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous
and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum
State.”153 The Court cited to International Shoe for this proposition;
however, International Shoe never used the words “essentially at home” to
describe (what would become) general jurisdiction.154 The Court then
elaborated that “[f]or an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of
general jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile; for a corporation, it is an
equivalent place, one in which the corporation is fairly regarded as at
home,” which can include the place of incorporation or the principal place
of business.155 Hence, the case suggested a conflation between “domicile,”
a distinct method of asserting personal jurisdiction,156 and general
jurisdiction, a subset of the minimum contacts method of asserting personal
jurisdiction.
This framework has now been further entrenched in the Court’s
jurisprudence, as the Court reaffirmed the requirement that a corporation be
“essentially at home” in Daimler AG v. Bauman.157
151

Id. at 929.
See Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984).
153
Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 317
(1945)) (emphasis added).
154
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945) (“there have been instances in
which the continuous corporate operations within a state were thought so substantial and of
such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely
distinct from those activities.”). While the Goodyear Court’s “essentially at home”
language is a logical extension of this, it certainly marked a narrowing.
155
Goodyear, 564 U.S at 924 (citing Lea Brilmayer et al., A General Look at General
Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. REV. 723, 728 (1988)).
156
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462 (1940) (“Domicile in the state is alone
sufficient to bring an absent defendant within the reach of the state’s jurisdiction for
purposes of a personal judgment . . . .”).
157
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014). In Daimler, the Court explained that
“Goodyear did not hold that a corporation may be subject to general jurisdiction only in a
forum where it is incorporated or has its principal place of business; it simply typed those
places paradigm all-purpose forums.” Id. at 137. The Court, however, did not provide an
example of when a court could assert general jurisdiction absent those examples, as it
restated that the test for general jurisdiction is “not whether a foreign corporation’s in-forum
152
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B. The Bristol-Myers Opinion
1. Facts of the Case
Bristol-Myers Squibb (“BMS”) is a pharmaceutical company
incorporated in Delaware, headquartered in New York, and with substantial
operations in New Jersey.158 The company also operates in other states
including California.159 At the time of Bristol-Myers, the company had five
research labs and employed approximately 300 people in California.160
One of BMS’s most popular drugs is a blood thinner called Plavix.161
While BMS did not manufacture Plavix or develop marketing schemes for
Plavix in California, it did sell a lot of Plavix there.162 Indeed, BMS sold
approximately 187 million Plavix pills in California from 2006 through
2012.163 This represented over $900 million in sales, about one percent of
BMS’s nationwide sales.164
Six hundred seventy-eight plaintiffs sued BMS in a mass tort action in
California state court, alleging injuries linked to Plavix.165 Eighty-six of
these plaintiffs were from California while the other 592 were from thirtythree other states.166 Asserting various tort claims under California law,
“[t]he nonresident plaintiffs did not allege that they obtained Plavix
through California physicians or from any other California source; nor did
they claim that they were injured by Plavix or treated for their injuries in
California.”167
2. Procedural History
BMS moved for dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction as to the
nonresident claims.168 The California trial court denied this motion, finding
that California could assert general jurisdiction over BMS because of its
continuous business activity in the state.169 Hence, according to the
California trial court, the claim did not have to relate to BMS’s activities in
contacts can be said to be in some sense ‘continuous and systematic,’ it is whether that
corporation’s ‘affiliations with the State are so “continuous and systematic” as to render [it]
essentially at home in the forum State.’” Id. at 138–39 (citing Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919).
158
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1777–78 (2017).
159
Id. at 1778.
160
Id.
161
Id. at 1784 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
162
Id.
163
Id.
164
Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1778.
165
Id.
166
Id.
167
Id.
168
Id.
169
Id.
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California.170 The California court of appeals affirmed, but in response to
the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Daimler, which further
limited general jurisdiction, the California Supreme Court reversed the
court of appeals.171
Instead of vacating its order asserting personal jurisdiction over BMS,
the court of appeals changed its opinion and found that specific jurisdiction
existed over BMS as to the claims of the nonresident plaintiffs.172 The
California Supreme Court affirmed this conclusion by using the sliding
scale approach, finding that “‘BMS’s extensive contacts with California
permitted the exercise of specific jurisdiction ‘based on a less direct
connection between BMS’s forum activities and plaintiffs’ claims than
might otherwise be required.’”173
3. The United States Supreme Court Opinion
In an 8-1 opinion written by Justice Alito, the Supreme Court reversed
the California Supreme Court.174 The Court began its analysis by
describing the difference between general and specific jurisdiction.175 Here
the Court once again reaffirmed the Goodyear framework for general
jurisdiction.176 Then moving to specific jurisdiction the Court further
explained:
In order for a state court to exercise specific jurisdiction, ‘the
suit’ must ‘aris[e] out of or relat[e] to the defendant’s contacts
with the forum.’177 In other words, there must be ‘an affiliation
between the forum and the underlying controversy, principally,
[an] activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State
and is therefore subject to the State’s regulation.’ For this
reason, ‘specific jurisdiction is confined to adjudication of issues
deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy that
establishes
jurisdiction.’178

170

See Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1778.
Id.
172
Id.
173
Id. at 1779 (quoting Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 377 P.3d 874, 889
(2016)).
174
Id. at 1777.
175
Id. at 1779–80.
176
Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1780 (“‘For an individual, the paradigm forum for the
exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile; for a corporation, it is an
equivalent place . . . .’”) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564
U.S. 915, 924 (2011)).
177
Id. (quoting Daimler, 134 S. Ct., at 754 (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984)) (emphasis added by the Court in BristolMyers).
178
Id. (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919).
171
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Based on this standard, the Court held that its “settled principles
regarding specific jurisdiction control this case.”179 The Court first
dispensed with the California Supreme Court’s use of the sliding scale
approach, holding that the approach “is difficult to square with our
precedents.”180 Furthermore, the Court explained that this particular case
exposes the danger of the sliding scale approach because “[t]he State
Supreme Court found that specific jurisdiction was present without
identifying any adequate link between the State and the nonresidents’
claims.” 181 The Court defended this assertion by stating:
[T]he nonresidents were not prescribed Plavix in California, did
not purchase Plavix in California, did not ingest Plavix in
California, and were not injured by Plavix in California. The
mere fact that other plaintiffs were prescribed, obtained, and
ingested Plavix in California—and allegedly sustained the same
injuries as did the nonresidents—does not allow the State to
assert specific jurisdiction over the nonresidents’ claims . . . .
This remains true even when third parties (here, the plaintiffs
who reside in California) can bring claims similar to those
brought by the nonresidents . . . . What is needed—and is
missing here—is a connection between the forum and the
specific claims at issue.182
The Court then reversed the California Supreme Court’s assertion of
specific jurisdiction and remanded for a decision not inconsistent with its
opinion.183
4. Justice Sotomayor’s Dissent
Although the majority opinion held that “settled principles regarding
specific jurisdiction control this case,”184 Justice Sotomayor’s dissent
suggests that it is not necessarily a straightforward application of
precedent. 185 Justice Sotomayor noted that the nexus requirement used to
only require that the claim “relate to” the defendant’s contacts in the
179
Id. at 1781. As this comment later argues, this characterization of the law as “settled”
seems somewhat strained, because the formulation the Court relies upon comes largely from
dicta describing specific jurisdiction in Goodyear, a general jurisdiction case, which the
Court decided only six years earlier.
180
Id. at 1781. (“[T]his approach . . . resembles a loose and spurious form of general
jurisdiction.”).
181
Id.
182
Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1781 (emphasis in original).
183
Id. at 1784. I have omitted the Court’s discussions of Keeton v. Hustler Magazine,
Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984) and Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985) because
those discussions do not directly pertain to the Court’s formulation of the nexus
requirement.
184
Id. at 1781.
185
See id. at 1787–88 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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forum.186 She then pointed out that the nonresidents’ claims “concern
conduct materially identical” to the conduct that caused the residents’
claims; thus, the nonresidents’ claims “related to” BMS’s minimum
contacts with California.187 As stated by Justice Sotomayor, “[o]ur cases
require no connection more direct than that.”188
Conversely, Justice Sotomayor noted that if a negligently maintained
sidewalk outside of BMS’s New York office caused injury to a plaintiff,
there would be no connection because the claim does not arise out of or
relate to BMS’s pharmaceutical-related conduct in California.189 Justice
Sotomayor’s dissent, therefore, appears to approve of the similarity
approach.
As this Comment points out in the next section, Justice Sotomayor’s
dissent flags that the majority opinion was not necessarily a straightforward
application of personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. Instead, Bristol-Myers
marked a narrowing of the nexus requirement, as it ultimately rejected the
similarity approach.
V. EFFECT ON THE NEXUS REQUIREMENT
Despite the Court’s indication that it decided Bristol-Myers through a
“straightforward application . . . of settled principles of personal
jurisdiction,” this Comment suggests that the opinion altered the analysis
under the nexus requirement.190 The classifications of the varying
interpretations of the nexus requirement using Justice Brennan’s
framework provides a frame of reference for the landscape of the nexus
requirement. Using these reference points, the opinion can now be applied
to each of the interpretations of the nexus requirement to determine which
interpretations have been affected by the opinion.
First, under Justice Brennan’s framework, it is apparent that the Court
in Bristol-Myers did not implicate or alter the meaning of “arise out of”
because BMS’s contacts in California did not give rise to an element of the
nonresidents’ prima facie case.191 Moving to the more inclusive “relate to”
portion of the nexus requirement, Bristol-Myers did not affect the causal
approaches because the nonresidents’ claims were not caused by BMS’s
contacts in California.192 On the other hand, as the next section will
186

Id. at 1786.
Id.
188
Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1781.
189
Id.
190
Id. at 1783.
191
Id. at 1781.
192
Id. The opinion avoided the question of which causation approach (but-for or
proximate) due process may require, as it dispensed with the argument that BMS contracted
187
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explain, the opinion clearly stamped out the similarity approach as well as
the sliding scale approach, at least as far as the sliding scale approach may
be used to supplement the similarity approach. This Comment argues,
however, that the opinion did not categorically reject a non-causal
approach, as the opinion still likely left room for hybrid jurisdiction.
A. The Sliding Scale Approach and Similarity Approach
Though short of explicitly calling the sliding scale approach
unconstitutional in all facets, the opinion clearly did not look favorably on
the approach and certainly invalidated its use in a non-causal context.193
Indeed, some commenters have taken the opinion to mean that the sliding
scale approach has been rejected outright.194 The opinion, however, still
arguably leaves room for the implementation of the sliding scale, providing
there is an “adequate link between the State and the nonresidents’
claims.”195 The Court appeared to only take issue with the sliding scale
approach because it allowed the California Supreme Court to “f[i]nd that
specific jurisdiction was present without identifying any adequate
link . . . .”196 Hence, the opinion does not allow a court to use the sliding
scale to create an “adequate link.”197 While the opinion did not define what
an “adequate link” must consist of, the Court’s language immediately
following its insistence on an “adequate link” provides some clarity. The
Court pointed out that “the nonresidents were not prescribed Plavix in
California [nor did they] purchase Plavix in California . . . .”198 This
language potentially provides examples of what would have constituted a
necessary “adequate link.” These examples provide factual scenarios
where, under the but-for causation approach, a court would be able to assert
“with a California company . . . to distribute [Plavix] nationally,” on evidentiary grounds.
Id. at 1783. Had the Court found that BMS did in fact use a California company as a means
of nationally distributing Plavix, and that a nonresident claimant was injured by a pill the
California company distributed, then the opinion would have implicated the causation
approaches. Had this been the case, the Court would have likely needed to decide whether
the causal connection between BMS and the nonresident, through the California distributor,
was strong enough to assert specific jurisdiction. The Court did not perform this type of
analysis. Hence, the causation approaches are constitutionally unaffected by the opinion.
193
Id. at 1781.
194
Personal Jurisdiction, 30 APPELLATE ADVOCATE 9, 32 (2017) (“The United States
Supreme Court reversed and . . . clearly rejected the sliding scale standard . . . .”).
195
Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1781 (emphasis added). The remainder of this Comment
will use the term “adequate link” as a short hand for “an adequate link between the State and
the nonresidents’ claims” or, alternatively stated, “a connection between the forum and the
specific claims at issue.” Id.
196
Id.
197
If it did allow the sliding scale to create a connection between the claim and the
forum, the Court would not have found that such a connection was missing. See id.
198
Id.
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personal jurisdiction.199 Therefore, one can speculate that a causal
connection between the plaintiff’s claim and the forum would constitute an
“adequate link.”
This suggests that the sliding scale approach may remain viable as a
supplement to the but-for causation approach. If perhaps the causal
connection between the plaintiff’s claim and the forum is attenuated, but
the defendant’s contacts with the forum are very strong, a court may use
the sliding scale’s logic to find that the stronger contacts have the effect of
allowing specific jurisdiction despite a relatively weak causal connection.
Or conversely, if there is a weak causal connection and the defendant also
has weak contacts with the forum, a court could slide the other way, finding
that the connection is not adequate.
Nonetheless, the opinion clearly rejects the sliding scale approach
when used to supplement the similarity approach, considering that this is
the exact way the California Supreme Court used the sliding scale
approach.200 Therefore, the Court also necessarily rejected the pure
similarity approach as a potential means of creating an “adequate link.”201
Without the similarity approach, the opinion only leaves the causation
approaches, and potentially hybrid jurisdiction,202 as viable interpretations
of the nexus requirement. Considering that hybrid jurisdiction, only
operates under narrowly specified circumstances, Bristol-Myers has
reasonably mandated that causation between the defendant’s forum
contacts and the plaintiff’s claim must serve as the necessary “connection
between the forum and the specific claims at issue” in the vast majority of
cases.203
B. Hybrid Jurisdiction
Though the Court has clearly disallowed similarity between the
defendant’s continuous forum contacts and the defendant’s non-forum
199
See supra Sec. III. A. Had a nonresident plaintiff bought or been prescribed Plavix
in California and then been injured anywhere in the world, under the but-for causation test
espoused in Carnival Cruise, the nonresident would be able to sue BMS in California.
Indeed, the facts would be analogous to Carnival Cruise in which the plaintiff entered a
contract in the forum and then became injured as a result of that contract. Shute v. Carnival
Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 379 (9th Cir. 1990).
200
Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1781 (“[T]he California Supreme Court’s ‘sliding scale
approach’ is difficult to square with our precedents. . . . Our cases provide no support for
this approach, which resembles a loose and spurious form of general jurisdiction.”).
201
Id. (Stating that a connection between the defendant and a “third party . . . is an
insufficient basis for jurisdiction. . . . [And] [t]his remains true even when third parties
(here, the plaintiffs who reside in California) can bring claims similar to those brought by
the nonresidents.”) (emphasis added) (citation and internal quotations omitted).
202
The next section discusses this possibility in depth.
203
Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1781.
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contacts that caused the plaintiff’s claim to constitute an “adequate link,”
the Court did not necessarily rule out hybrid jurisdiction. Significantly,
Professor Sandstrom Simard’s formulation, while requiring similarity
between the forum and non-forum contacts, requires an additional
“connection between the forum and the specific claims at issue:”204 the
injury must occur inside the forum.205
The facts that implicate hybrid jurisdiction are different from the
factual situation in Bristol-Myers. Bristol-Myers could have implicated
hybrid jurisdiction had a nonresident who bought Plavix in a state other
than California, subsequently traveled to California where her injury then
occurred. Everything else remains the same in that (1) BMS’s contacts
with California did not cause the injury, (2) BMS has strong contacts with
California, and (3) those contacts are similar or identical to the activities
that caused the injury. The only key difference is that the injury occurs in
California. By altering the facts in this way, Bristol-Myers would be
directly analogous to the facts in Renault and Lemke, the two cases
Professor Simard used to illustrate hybrid jurisdiction.206
While Bristol-Myers does not deal with this factual scenario, language
in the opinion suggests that under this factual scenario specific jurisdiction
would be valid despite a non-causal connection between the defendant’s
forum contacts and the plaintiff’s claim. This language comes, once again,
from the Court’s insistence on an “adequate link.”207 While this Comment
has already argued that a causal connection between the defendant’s forum
contacts and the plaintiff’s claim constitutes an “adequate link,” the opinion
also left open the possibility that injury in the forum could create an
“adequate link,” even without a causal connection between the defendant’s
forum contacts and the plaintiff’s claim.
First, in defining the nexus requirement, the Court stated that “there
must be ‘an affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy,
principally, [an] activity or an occurrence, that takes place in the forum
State . . . .”208 An injury in the forum would likely constitute an activity or
occurrence in the forum. Furthermore, the opinion noticeably deviated
from the standard definition of the nexus requirement. While the Court in
Helicopteros defined the nexus requirement as fulfilled “in a suit arising
out of or related to the defendant’s contacts with the forum,”209 the BristolMyers Court stated that the connection must be between the plaintiff’s
204
205
206
207
208
209

Id.
Sandstrom Simard, supra note 7, at 606.
Infra Sec. III. D.
Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1781.
Id. at 1780 (emphasis added).
Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 413 n.8 (1984).
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claim and the forum.210 This suggests that an injury in the forum, while not
causally connected to the defendant’s forum contacts, still fulfills the nexus
requirement, as the plaintiff’s claim is quite persuasively connected to the
forum, when the injury occurred there.
Additionally, in explaining why an “adequate link” was missing, the
Court noted that “the nonresidents were not prescribed Plavix in California,
did not purchase Plavix in California, did not ingest Plavix in California,
and were not injured by Plavix in California.”211 This language, at the very
least, suggests that an injury in the forum is a relevant fact to consider.
Furthermore, the first two missing connections, listed by the Bristol-Myers
Court, between the nonresidents’ claims and the forum clearly implicate a
causal relationship between a plaintiffs’ claim and the forum.212 Thus,
because the first two items on the list would likely constitute an “adequate
link,” one can infer that the second two items on the list would also
independently constitute an “adequate link.”213 On the other hand, this list
could have been a rhetorical flourish by the Court. This language could
simply have been a list of all the ways by which the nonresidents’ claims
were completely unrelated to California as a means of bolstering the
Court’s ultimate holding.214 Therefore, this language serves as a marker
that the Court can later use in a case that potentially implicates hybrid
jurisdiction if it chooses to adopt the theory. Otherwise, the Court can
conceivably dismiss this language as dicta. As of now, however, this
language keeps the possibility of hybrid jurisdiction viable.
The recent opinion of the Minnesota Supreme Court in Bandemer v.
Ford Motor Company and the opinion of the Montana Supreme Court in
Ford Motor Company v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, both of
210

Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1781.
Id. (emphasis added).
212
Both situations would clearly pass the but-for causation test.
213
The opinion, however, does not appear to leave room for Rhodes and Robertson’s
more expansive suggestion. Rhodes & Robertson, supra note 77, at 240. The opinion
requires an “adequate link” or “connection between the forum and the specific claims at
issue,” not between the plaintiff and the forum. Thus, simply being a resident of California
would likely not save jurisdiction had the individual bought, used, and became injured by
Plavix in another state. See Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1781. Nonetheless, the spirit of
Rhodes and Robertson’s proposed test is generally supported by Bristol-Myers.
214
Some commenters potentially agree that the Court intended the opinion to strictly
require causation. Bender, supra note 6.
[Bristol-Myers’] insistence on the paramount importance of a clear
connection between the defendant’s in-forum activities and the plaintiff’s
particular claim suggests that the Court is likely to reject assertions of
jurisdiction based only on contacts that are “related to” the cause of action
but where the cause of action does not truly “arise out of” defendant’s
activities in the forum.
Id.
211
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which the United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari, further
support the viability of hybrid jurisdiction.215
In Bandemer, the plaintiff, Adam Bandemer, was a passenger in a
1994 Ford Crown Victoria that crashed into a ditch in Minnesota after the
driver rear-ended a snowplow.216 The plaintiff alleged that he suffered
severe brain injuries because the vehicle’s airbags failed to deploy.217 The
particular Ford vehicle involved in the crash “was designed in Michigan;
assembled in 1993 in Ontario, Canada; and sold in Bismarck, North Dakota
in 1994.”218 After going through the hands of four different owners, the
vehicle was registered in Minnesota in 2011 and then re-registered by a
fifth owner, the father of the driver in the January 2015 crash injuring
Bandemer, in 2013.219 At the time of the accident, Ford had sold more than
2,000 1994 Crown Victoria cars, and approximately 200,000 other vehicles
in 2013, 2014, and 2015 to dealerships in Minnesota.220 Ford also regularly
advertised its vehicles in Minnesota.221 These facts directly implicate
hybrid jurisdiction, as Ford’s Montana contacts, while related to
Bandemer’s injury in Montana, did not cause Bandemer’s injury in
Montana.
Ford challenged personal jurisdiction, and both the district court and
court of appeals held that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Ford
was proper.222 The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed, first finding that
Ford made sufficient minimum contacts with the Minnesota through Ford’s
sales and advertising in the state.223
The Minnesota Supreme Court then moved to the question of whether
there was a “connection [between] the cause of action [and] Ford’s contacts
with the state.”224 In ultimately finding that there was a connection, and
thus the nexus requirement fulfilled, the court specifically rejected Ford’s
argument for the court to “adopt a causal standard for this prong, under
which the defendant’s contacts with Minnesota must have caused the
plaintiff’s claims for personal jurisdiction over the defendant to be

215
Bandemer v. Ford Motor Co., 931 N.W.2d 744 (Minn. 2019), cert. granted, 2020
WL 254152 (U.S. Jan. 17, 2020) (No. 19-369); Ford Motor Co., v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist.
Ct., 443 P.3d 407 (Mont. 2019), cert. granted, 2020 WL 254155 (U.S. Jan. 17, 2020) (No.
19-368).
216
Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 748.
217
Id.
218
Id. at 757–58 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
219
Id. at 758 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
220
Id. at 748.
221
Id.
222
Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 748.
223
Id. at 750–51.
224
Id. at 751.
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proper.”225 The court further rejected Ford’s argument that Bristol-Myers
compelled a causation approach.226 Specifically, the court distinguished the
case from Bristol-Myers noting that the Court in Bristol-Myers
“specifically mentioned the lack of injury to [the] plaintiffs in California,
and concluded that ‘a connection between the forum and the specific claims
at issue’ was ‘missing.’”227 The Minnesota Supreme Court took this
language from Bristol-Myers to mean that a “plaintiff’s contacts are
relevant to the analysis of the ‘affiliation between the forum and the
underlying controversyFalse’”228 Thus, the court concluded that there was
“a substantial connection between the defendant Ford, the forum
Minnesota, and the claims brought by Bandemer,” despite the existence of
a non-causal relationship between Ford’s contacts in Minnesota and
Bandemer’s claim.229 The Bandemer opinion, tracked hybrid jurisdiction’s
requirements and ultimately applied a functional version of hybrid
jurisdiction. Significantly, the opinion reconciled this approach with
Bristol-Myers. As the next section articulates, it would be unfair for a court
to be unable to assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a case like
Bandemer. Thus, the United States Supreme Court should affirm the
Minnesota Supreme Court by embracing hybrid jurisdiction when it
decides Bandemer.

225

Id. at 751–52 (internal quotations and insertions omitted).
Id. at 752–54.
227
Id. at 754 (quoting Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781
(2017)). The Montana Supreme Court, in Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial
District Court, distinguished Bristol-Myers on the same basis. Ford Motor Co. v. Montana
Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 443 P.3d 407, 417 (Mont. 2019). Ford, involved nearly identical
material facts to Bandemer, as the case involved a 1996 Ford Explorer that crashed in
Montana due to an alleged defect in the vehicle’s tires. Id. at 411. The specific Ford
Explorer involved in the crash was not designed, manufactured, nor sold by Ford in
Montana. Id. Instead, Ford originally sold the vehicle in Washington State, and the vehicle
was eventually resold in Montana. Id. Similar to Bandemer, at the time of the crash, Ford
otherwise did business in Montana. Id. at 414. Specifically, the company sold Ford
Explorers to dealerships in Montana. Id. In deciding that Montana could validly assert
specific jurisdiction over Ford, the Montana Supreme distinguished Bristol-Myers noting
that the plaintiffs in Bristol-Myers “were not injured by Plavix in California,” while the
plaintiff in Ford, “was injured while driving the Explorer in Montana.” Id. at 417 (quoting
Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1781). Thus, the Montana Supreme Court held that BristolMyers did “not impact [the court’s] analysis regarding whether [the plaintiff’s] claims relate
to Ford’s Montana contacts because [the plaintiff] was injured while driving the Explorer in
Montana.” Id. Therefore, the Montana Supreme Court functionally applied hybrid
jurisdiction.
228
Bandemer, 931 N.W.2d at 754 (quoting Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1781).
229
Id. at 755.
226
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VI. THE COURT SHOULD EMBRACE HYBRID JURISDICTION
Having established that the possibility of hybrid jurisdiction remains
viable, indeed the only viable means of asserting non-causal specific
jurisdiction, this Comment now argues that embracing the approach would
be a prudent decision. Without, this non-causal reading of “relate to,”
patently unfair results could follow. This unfairness can be demonstrated
by the result that would follow if a causation only approach is applied to
the classic case World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson.230
In World-Wide, plaintiffs Harry and Kay Robinson bought an Audi
vehicle from a car dealer in Massena, New York in 1976.231 The next year,
the Robinsons left New York to live in Arizona.232 While the Robinsons
were driving through Oklahoma on their way to Arizona, another car
crashed into the Robinsons’ Audi vehicle.233 The crash caused a fire,
which severely burned Kay Robinson and her two children. 234
The question before the Court was whether Oklahoma could assert
personal jurisdiction over the local car dealership in Massena and the
regional car distributor.235 The Supreme Court ultimately said no, because
the car only reached Oklahoma through the unilateral activity of the
plaintiffs, and thus those defendants had no qualifying minimum contacts
with Oklahoma.236 The Robinsons, however, also sued Audi, a German
corporation, in Oklahoma, and Audi, did not contest jurisdiction.237 Had
Audi challenged personal jurisdiction, under the post-Goodyear and
Bristol-Myers landscape the only viable way to assert jurisdiction over
Audi would be if courts embrace hybrid jurisdiction. Furthermore, it would
be fundamentally unfair to shield Audi from suit in Oklahoma under such
facts.
Under modern personal jurisdiction jurisprudence, had Audi
challenged personal jurisdiction, the only means of establishing personal
jurisdiction over Audi under these facts would be through hybrid
jurisdiction.
Goodyear and Daimler heavily suggest that general
jurisdiction over Audi would not be viable because Audi was not
incorporated in Oklahoma, did not have its principal place of business in
Oklahoma, and, similar to Daimler, Audi’s sale of cars in Oklahoma would

230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237

World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
Id. at 288.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 295–96.
World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 295–96.
See id. at 288 n.3.
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not render the corporation “essentially at home” in Oklahoma.238 Hence,
the only way to assert jurisdiction over Audi would be through specific
jurisdiction. If this specific jurisdiction were subsequently limited to
requiring causation between the defendant’s forum contacts and the
plaintiff’s claim, jurisdiction would be lacking. There was no causal
connection between Audi’s sales in Oklahoma and Robinson’s car
accident. Because the Robinsons bought the car in New York, not
Oklahoma, this would not even pass a but-for causation test. Thus, a noncausal test would be needed, and here the facts fit the requirements of the
hybrid jurisdiction model on all fours. Indeed, Professor Sandstrom
Simard used the facts of World-Wide in support of the assertion of hybrid
jurisdiction.239
The facts of World Wide present the most compelling reason for
adopting hybrid jurisdiction as an approach to the nexus requirement.
Without it, unjust results would follow. It would be unfair to not hold Audi
liable in Oklahoma where it regularly sells cars, benefits from the laws of
the state, and can readily foresee lawsuits in the forum. Furthermore, to not
do so would effectively protect companies like Audi from suit altogether.
If, for instance, the Oklahoma court could not assert jurisdiction over Audi,
the Robinsons would only be able to bring their claim in New York or
Audi’s principal place of business, Germany. This would make it nearly
impossible for the Robinsons to bring suit, when all of the accident and
medical witnesses were in Oklahoma. The added expense of bringing these
witnesses to New York could very well render a proceeding prohibitively
expensive for many litigants.
The most plausible counter-argument for rejecting the hybrid
jurisdiction model is that, like all tests not based on causation, it presents
risks of unfairness to the defendant and forum shopping.240 Any fear of
forum shopping, however, can be dismissed in such a situation, because the
injury itself happened in the forum. In other words, the “adequate link” of
the injury occurring in the forum prevents an arbitrary choice of forum.
238

Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 138–39 (2014) (stating that the test for
general jurisdiction “is not whether a foreign corporation’s in-forum contacts can be said to
be in some sense ‘continuous and systematic,’ it is whether that corporation’s ‘affiliations
with the State are so “continuous and systematic” as to render [it] essentially at home in the
forum State.’”(quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915,
919 (2011)).
239
Sandstrom Simard, supra note 7, at 600. This hypothetical has been the impetus for
other commenters to suggest tests similar to hybrid jurisdiction. Indeed, Rhodes and
Robertson relied on the facts of World-Wide to support their nexus requirement approach.
Rhodes & Robertson, supra note 77, at 240–41.
240
Brilmayer, supra note 77, at 84 (“the similarity test would apparently have to allow
jurisdiction in any State in the country where the defendant has engaged in similar
activities . . . [this is] extremely elastic and lead[s] to dubious results.”).
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VII. STILL A QUESTION OF SIMILARITY WITHIN THE HYBRID JURISDICTION
FRAMEWORK
Providing courts do adopt the hybrid approach as a narrow reading of
“relate to,” a difficult question will still remain. Like all “relate to”
interpretations, there is still a similarity component within the hybrid
approach. As Professor Sandstrom Simard noted the continuous contacts
must be those that “could result in factual circumstances similar to those
that gave rise to the plaintiff’s claim.”241 The Bristol-Myers opinion does
not hinge on similarity, and even if the injury occurred in the forum and a
court found an “adequate link,” similarity would not be an issue because
the conduct was identical to the conduct that gave rise to the claim. But
what if BMS did not sell Plavix in California but sold other similar drugs?
The hybrid approach would necessarily need clarifying as to what degree of
similarity is required.242
A difficult factual scenario would not be hard to imagine either.
Indeed, the facts of Goodyear could implicate the problem.243 Altering the
facts of Goodyear, imagine the bus accident occurred in North Carolina,
instead of France. Next, assume that Goodyear USA produced the
defective tires in the accident, rather than the three foreign subsidiaries.
Furthermore, assume that Goodyear USA had continuous contacts with
North Carolina, but was not essentially at home there. Providing Goodyear
sells the exact type of tire in North Carolina, the case would implicate a
paradigmatic example of when hybrid jurisdiction would be useful. But
what if Goodyear did not sell the same type of tire in North Carolina?244
Here, the defendant’s contacts with the forum would be similar but not
identical to the activities that caused the injury. Deciding the degree of
similarity required will necessarily be a question in need of clarification if
courts come to fully embrace the hybrid approach.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Bristol-Myers has absolutely marked a change in personal jurisdiction
jurisprudence. Bristol-Myers has clearly limited the breadth of the nexus
requirement to largely requiring causation between the forum and the
plaintiff’s claim. The opinion, however, still leaves room for Professor
Simard’s concept of hybrid jurisdiction, which does not require causation
241

Sandstrom Simard, supra note 7, at 589.
Rhodes and Robertson similarly point out this issue in their proposal. Rhodes &
Robertson, supra note 77, at 242.
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Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 920–23.
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This was the actual scenario in Goodyear. Id. at 921 (“[T]he type of tire involved in
the accident, a Goodyear Regional RHS tire manufactured by Goodyear Turkey, was never
distributed in North Carolina.”).
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between the defendant’s contacts and the plaintiff’s claim under narrow
circumstances. In order to ensure fairness in the rapidly diminishing realm
of personal jurisdiction, courts ought to embrace this limited non-causal
approach in Bandemer v. Ford Motor Co. and Ford Motor Co. v. Montana
Eighth Judicial District Court.

